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I. INTRODUCTION 
The use of citizen's initiatives to amend state constitutions reached record high levels 
in the 1992-93 biennium.' By far the most popular subject of both constitutional and 
statutory initiatives during this period was the imposition of term limits on elected 
representatives. Voters passed all seventeen of the term limit initiatives that appeared on the 
r 
1992 ballot, and most of these initiatives passed by an overwhelming majority.' Both the 
volume and the subject matter of citizen's initiatives in the 1990s suggest an unmistakable 
conclusion: there is a widespread and deep-seated distrust of representative government in 
our nation today. 
Proponents of the initiative argue that it provides a healthy means of turning a voter's 
distrust into much-needed governmental reform. Yet critics are quick to point out that 
correcting the abuses of representative government is not the only objective of the initiative 
campaigns of the 1990s. The initiative also has been used to denigrate the rights of 
minorities, as evidenced by California's Proposition 187 and Colorado's recent initiative 
restricting the rights of gays and lesbians. Critics of these anti-minority initiatives are now in 
court trying to invalidate them on federal constitutional grounds.' Regardless of what 
protection the courts provide in these cases, many critics will continue to argue the initiative 
has become a weapon of tyrannical majorities and wealthy special interest groups. In 
addition to threatening the rights of minorities, some critics argue this weapon may 
undermine the federal guarantee that each state shall have a republican form of government.' 
On a philosophical level, the current debate over the proper roles of initiatives and 
elected representatives turns on the same issue that prevailed at the time the earliest state 
constitutions were framed: how shall we choose between popular sovereignty and 
representative government?' Yet at a practical level, the question is not that simple. In no 
state does the initiative entirely supplant the legislative process, nor does the work of a state 
legislature necessarily crush every vestige of popular sovereignty. On the contrary, every 
state that has an initiative process also has a legislature, and in these states, "the legislature 
and the initiative not only coexist but interact in a system of lawmaki~g."~ Thus, the real 
question is not whether laws and constitutional amendments should be enacted through either 
a legislature or a citizen's initiative, but how to obtain the right blend of representative 
institutions and direct democratic processes? Moreover, in formulating this blend, "[tlhe 
great challenge . . . is to go beyond general statements and to come up with concrete and 
practical recommendations. "' 
The purpose of this article is to answer this challenge by offering a concrete proposal 
for a new method of bringing about constitutional change that combines elements of 
representative government with the type of direct democratic influence associated with the 
r' 
citizen's initiative. This proposal is intended to strike a balance between the need to provide 
citizens with unimpeded access to a legitimate means of reforming their government and the 
countervailing interest in protecting minorities and legislatures from the sorts of abuses 
associated with the traditional, direct initiative process. Although this article uses the 
constitutional amendment process in the State of New Mexico as its primary example, the 
method proposed to stmcme this amendment process is intended to serve as the foundation 
for further work on new methods of enacting both statutory and constitutional initiatives in A 
other states. 
Part I1 of this article begins the task of constructing a new method of amending state 
constitutions by reviewing the various procedures that states have devised to structure the 
process of constitutional change in the past. Part III then focuses on the initiative process in 
particular and analyzes the strengths and weaknesses of this process in its traditional form. 
This analysis sets the stage for the concluding sections of this article, which set forth a 
concrete proposal for a new method of constitutional change and show how this new method 
avoids the weaknesses of the traditional initiative process while enhancing its strengths. 
XI. STRUCTURING THE PROCESS OF CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 
The earliest state constitutions can be divided into two waves. The first wave of state 
constitutions, exemplified by the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776, were written and ratified 
exclusively by legislative bodies. Not surprisingly, these constitutions made legislatures the 
predominant branch of government. The second wave of state constitutions, exemplified by 
the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780, generally were drafted and ratified by conventions 
p specially elected for that purpose. These constitutions had more checks and balances to 
counter the legislative power, but only two of them were sent to the people for ratification? 
A total of twenty-eight state constitutions were adopted prior to 1800. With respect to 
providing for constitutional amendment or revision, these early constitutions can be grouped 
into three categories: those that had no provisions regarding constitutional amendment, those 
that gave the legislature control over the amendment process, and those that reserved to the 
people the right to simply abolish the existing government and start over.'' None of these 
early constitutions resulted in a workable, legal method of structuring constitutional change. 
r 
While the right to revolt and abolish the existing government may have worked in the 
extreme situation where "the ends of government are perverted . . . and all other means of 
redress are ineffectual,"" this right hardly provided an orderly procedure for making minor 
revisions and amendments. A constitution that was silent on the issue of amendment 
provided no better solution, for no matter how perfect and everlasting a constitution's framers 
envisioned their work to be, it still remained subject to a judicially recognized, inherent 
power of the people to revise their c~nstitution.'~ With this una~ticulated, inherent power 
looming over it, a constitution that was silent with respect to the amendment process provided r\ 
no more protection against revolution than a constitution that expressly reserved to the people 
the right to revolt. The third altemative, whereby legislatures took control of amending the 
state constitution, proved no more workable than the tirst two. A constitutional amendment 
process that thw- popular sovereignty only gave rise to constitutional change by 
extra-legal means, such as the famous Dorr Rebellion in Rhode Island during 1841-42.') 
Perhaps the most basic cause of constitutional turmoil during the early nineteenth 
century was the fact that so few of the state constitutions adopted before 1800 were sent to 
the people for ratification. Prior to that date, most constitutions simply were adopted by the 
members of legislative bodies or the delegates to constitutional conventions. A handful of 
states began sending proposed constitutional provisions to the people for ratification in the 
f h t  quarter of the nineteenth century. By 1857, Congress required referendums to approve 
constitutions for newly admitted states, and this procedure had become the norm. By 1900, 
only Delaware had no procedure requiring popular ratification of constitutional 
changes." 
After winning the limited right of the people to ratify or reject proposed constitutional 
/- 
changes submitted by the legislature or a constitutional convention, the champions of popular 
sovereignty tumed to a broader campaign to institutionalize two new methods of lawmaking: 
initiative and referendum. The inirim've is a process whereby new laws or constitutional 
changes are proposed and placed on the ballot by citizen's petition and then enacted by 
popular vote. 'q~tiatives can be divided into two types: direct inirim'ves, which are 
submitted directly to the voters without any action by the legislature, and indirect ininm'ves, 
which are proposed by citizen's petition but sent to the legislature for further action before 
r-- 
appearing on the ballot.I6 The referendum is a process whereby new laws or constitutional 
changes are passed by the legislature and then referred to electorate for final approval." 
Referenda also can be divided into two types: the popular referendum by which citizens can 
petition to have a law enacted by the legislature submitted for a vote by the people before 
going into effect, and the proposition submined by the legislature in which the state 
legislature submits to the voters a proposed constitutional amendment or statute without being 
prompted by a citizen's petitio~l.'~ 
Prior to 1898, the proposition submitted by the legislature was the only kind of 
n 
statewide initiative or referendum used in the United States. In that year, South Dakota 
became the first state to include a provision in its constitution allowing direct, statewide 
initiatives at both the statutory and constitutional level. Oregon was the first state to make 
law using the initiative process, enacting two statutes by initiative in 1904, followed by four 
constitutional amendments enacted by initiative in 1906.'9 
The initiative's success in Oregon fueled an explosive growth of initiative and 
referendum provisions in the constitutions and statutes of western states during the first pint 
-\ 
of the twentieth century. In 1907, Oklahoma became the first state to provide for initiative 
and referendum m its original state constitution, and Arizona followed suit in 1912." 
Between 1898 and 1918, nineteen states adopted the initiative in some fonn, and fourteen of 
these states allowed constitutional amendments to be proposed by initiative.'' 
Of the states admitted to the Union during the first half of the twentieth century, only 
New Mexico failed to provide a workable initiative and referendum provision in its original 
state constitution. The initiative was the most hotly debated topic at New Mexico's 
constitutional convention of 1910, but the ring of "Old Guard" Republicans who dominated 
,'-- 
the convention made sure that efforts to include an initiative provision in the state's 
constitution were soundly defeated. Instead, popurn in New Mexico had to settle for a 
referendum provision that was intended by its own dtafters to be un~orkab le .~  
Despite the shenanigans at New Mexico's constitutional convention, the use of 
initiative provisions in state constitutions throughout the nation peaked around the time New 
Mexico was admitted to the Union in 1912 -- attracting the support of such luminaries as 
labor leader Samuel Gompers and former president Theodore Roo~evel t .~ In that same year, 
I- 
the U.S. Supreme Court decided that the initiative could not be held invalid under the 
guarantee clause of the U.S. Constitution because such a holding would require the court to 
~ l e  on a political q u e s t i ~ n . ~  The use of the initiative soon peaked with ninety separate 
statutory and constitutional initiatives appearing on the ballot in 1914.= 
Even in the heyday of the progressive movement, the initiative was not without its 
critics. Most notably, President Taft, who had proclaimed New Mexico's admission to the 
Union in 1912, offered the following criticism after he left office and went to teach law at 
Yale University: 
Could any system be devised better adapted to the exaltation of cranks and the 
wearying of the electorate of their political duties than the giving of power to 5 
percent or even 8 percent of the voters to submit all the fads and nostrums that their 
active but impractical minds can devise, to be voted on in frequent  election^?^ 
President Taft's strongest criticism was reserved for the constitutional initiative, which he 
regarded as "minimiz[ing] the sacredness of those fundamental provisions securing the 
personal rights of the individual against the unjust aggression of the majority of the 
ele~torate."~ Taft's Attorney General, George Wickersham, had led an unsuccessful effort to 
block Arizona's admission to the Union because that state's constitution permitted the use of '7 
The decline in the creation and use of initiative provisions in the middle of the 
twentieth century is often attributed to fears sparked by the first world war and the Russian 
revolution. However, this decline also may be viewed as part of a larger shift in lawmaking 
power away from the states and toward the federal government. As one commentator notes, 
"[tlhe attempts of the states to develop modem constitutional power to deal with modern 
economic and social issues [during the first three decades of the twentieth century] were . . . 
.1 
10 
r 
all too often to be thwarted by a conservative [Supreme] Court obsessed with restraining 
government from interfering with the free enterprise system. "29 The restraint imposed by the 
Supreme Court during this period "created a vacuum in state constitutionalism which, in the 
depression of the thirties, invited federal occupancy. Initiatives at the state level were 
subsumed by this "vacuum in state constitutionalism" for many yeus before reemerging in 
the 1960s and 1970s, when Illinois, Montana and Florida added new initiative provisions to 
their  constitution^.^' 
The next method of amending state constitutions to appear on the American political 
r 
scene involved the use of commissions or other administrative bodies as sources of 
constitutional change. The use of constitutional commissions might be viewed as an 
outgrowth of the modem administrative state, as a symptom of the vacuum in state 
constitutionalism during the middle of the twentieth century, or as an ominous diminution of 
popular sovereignty. Adopting the latter view, one commentator suggests that the first 
constitutional commissions were the product of renegade legislatures that sought to revise 
outmoded state constitutions with a minimum of popular debate.= According to this view, 
the appointment of a commission was a means of dispensing with a constitutional convention - 
-- and with the level of constitutional debate, political compromise and citizen participation 
that should accompany a proper convention. In light of the high cost of holding a 
constitutional conventionU and the alarming rate at which voters have rejected full-scale 
constitutional revisions proposed at such conventions in recent years,% one can make an 
equally compelling argument that the current use of commissions is not intended to thwart 
popular sovereignty so much as it is intended to provide a method of constitutional revision 
that is more practical and efficient than holding a constitutional convention. 
7 
Although their role has diminished in the 1990s,% constitutional commissions remain 
at work in several states and serve two main purposes: "to study the constitution and propose 
changes; and to prepare for a constitutional con~ention."~ Commissions that are directed 
toward the first of these purposes generally are created by statute and serve .as advisors to the 
state legislature." The exception to this rule is the Florida Taxation and Budget Refonn 
Commission, which has the power to submit proposed constitutional amendments directly to 
the electorate.)' The second variety of constitutional commission, which is charged with the 
task of preparing for a convention, can be authorized in the constitution itselF or merely 
r--- 
created by an executive order.* All members of the constitutional commissions at work in 
the 1990s were appointed and not elected." 
The use of initiatives and commissions arguably has diminished the role of 
constitutional conventions in shaping constitutional change at the state level. Of the fourteen 
states that require a periodic referendum on the question of calling a convention, onIy three 
required a vote on this question during the 1992-93 biennium, and voters rejected the call in 
all three states.u Thus, piecemeal amendment by legislative proposal and popular ratification 
/- 
remains the norm in most states, accounting for eighty-four percent of all proposed 
constitutional changes submitted to the voters in 1992-93." A summary of the methods of 
constitutional change authorized in the constitutions of the fifty states is appended to this 
article as Table 1. 
Eighteen states currently allow their constitutions to be amended by citizen's initiative. 
A summary of the initiative process in each of these states is appended to this article as Table 
2. Among these states, California has remained at the center of controversy in recent years. 
F i  added to the state's constitution in 1911, California's provision for initiatives was seen /7 
as a reaction to the Southern Pacific Railroad's undue influence over state government." 
Among the most notable of California's early initiatives were a series of proposals to revamp 
the state's law enforcement and criminal justice systems. These early initiatives were 
sponsored by Earl Warren, who later became the Chief Justice of the Supreme C ~ u r t . ~  
By the end of the 1940s, critics argued that California's initiative provision made the 
state's constitution too easy to amend - subjecting it to "amend~mania."~ The legislature 
hied to correct this problem by adding a requirement that constitutional amendments or 
---. 
statutes proposed by initiative "relate to but one subject."" However, the California Supreme 
Court gave this single-subject rule a relaxed interpretation and never invalidated an initiative 
measure for violating the rule.* Among the initiatives that were challenged in court for 
allegedly violating the single-subject rule were the property tax relief amendment known as 
Proposition 13* and the "Crime Victim's Justice Reform Act" enacted as Proposition 115 in 
1990.' In addition to challenging these controversial initiatives in court, critics of 
,--~ 
California's initiative process have pursued reforms in the state legislature. In 1991, the 
California legislature was entertaining at least forty initiative reform proposals." 
The California legislature responded to these proposals by appointing a Citizen's 
Commission on Ballot Initiatives to study the advantages and disadvantages of the state's 
initiative process. This Commission returned its recommendations in January of 1994, and 
these recommendations have resulted in proposals for a new, hybrid method of constitutional 
amendment that attempts to integrate the initiative process with legislative procedures -- and 
thereby make initiatives more amendable and more subject to legislative o~ersight .~ A recent 
P 
example of this new hybrid approach is found in Mississippi's constitutional revisions of 
1992, according to which constitutional initiatives must be submitted to the legislature, and 
voters must then choose between the original initiative, the legislature's amended version of 
that initiative, or no initiative at all." 
111. CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT BY CITIZEN'S INITIATIVE 
Underlying the new methods of constitutional amendment proposed in California and 
enacted in Mississippi are two fundamental premises: first, the initiative process produces 
enough benefits to be worthy of retaining in some form, and second, the initiative process in 
- 
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its traditional form dating from the turn of the century is seriously flawed and in need of 
improvement. Among the flaws in the traditional initiative process are its potential for 
undermining the values of representative government, confusing or misleading voters, 
limiting access to the ballot to wealthy special interest groups, and providing a source of 
ill-conceived or unconstitutional amendments. Among the benefits of the initiative process 
are increasing citizen participation in government, educating voters, providing a source of 
innovation in lawmaking, and, perhaps most importantly, correcting the abuses of a 
representative system of government. To understand these benefits of the initiative, one must 
-2 
first examine how they arose in response to certain perceived defects in the legislative 
process. 
A. Defects in the Lcgislarive Process 
The notion that state legislatures were defective and untrustworthy was a major 
premise of the arguments presented in favor of the initiative during the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth century.% Proponents of the initiative saw three major problems with state 
legislatures during this period: the poor character of legislators, the domination of the 
legislative agenda by wealthy special interests, and the use of questionable legislative 
procedures that facilitated domination by special interests while obstructing citizen 
participation. 
At a philosophical level, complaints about the quality of legislators arise from the 
classic conflict between the common good and the good of the r~lers. '~ However, critics of 
state legislatures at the turn of the century did not explain the problem in such abstract terms. 
Instead, they attributed the poor quality of their legislators to the fact that "tilt is increasingly 
difficult today to get a man of serious knowledge on any subject to go to Congress, if he has 
r? 
other pursuit. and other sources of income. To get him to the state legislature, in any of the 
populous and busy states, is well-nigh impossible. "56 Behind this criticism was the idea that 
the apportionment of many state legislatures allowed rural districts to dominate the agenda 
with parochial issues that were considered routine and uninteresting by the young, urban 
professionals of the time. 
The poor quality of elected representatives remains a common complaint in the 1990s, 
and at least one cause of this complaint remains the same: the pool of candidates from which 
voters may draw is simply too small and homogenous. However, the reasons and the A 
remedies for this problem have changed. Rather than stemming from a learned professional's 
desire to avoid the rural, parochial nature of a malapportioned legislature, good candidates 
are now kept off the ballot because of their inability to muster the financial resources 
necessary to mount a serious campaign against an incumbent or "professional politician, " and 
because of concerns that the media will intrude upon the privacy of the candidates and their 
families. With regard to the first of these reasons, one recent study showed that state senate 
incumbents in California's 1986 election outspent their challengers by seventy five to one 
F..~ 
while state assembly incumbents outspent their opponents by thirty nine to one. Every single 
incumbent who sought reelection to the California legislature in 1986 won it.n Given this 
data, it is no surprise that term limits have replaced the initiative as the popular remedy for 
an untrustworthy legi~lature.'~ 
The efforts by which today's incumbents amass campaign funds from political action 
committees (PACs) and other high-paying special interest groups is comparable to the efforts 
by which political bosses of an earlier era inserted their puppet candidates into the political 
process. Both of these practices point to a second defect in representative government: the 
--. 
tight grip that wealthy specia1 interest groups or political bosses have on the legislative 
agenda. This grip was certainly felt at New Mexico's constitutional convention of 1910, 
where the agenda was controlled by land speculator Thomas Catron and his "Santa Fe 
Ring.n39 Other states also felt the grip of railroads, lumber and mining interests, banks and 
land speculators during this period. These interests saw state legislatures as merely a gateway 
through which they must pa,% in order to raid the state's treasury and natural reso~rces.~ By 
the l9XOs, public participation in the legislative process had increased dramatically in many 
/'- 
states, and this increase arguably makes it harder to discern which groups represent special 
interests rather than the public interest. Nonetheless, few will disagree that some particularly 
well-funded and highly influential interest groups remain a source of consternation to 
initiative proponents. According to an official of the California Republican Partqr, "the 
legislature was dominated by railroad interests [in 19 1 I]. Now it's dominated . . . by libera1 
politicians[;] we need another access to enact our agenda . . .. "61 
To understand how special interests can dominate a state legislature, it is necessary to f-'. 
understand the practice known as "logolling." This practice occurs when bgislators obtain 
enough votes to pass a measure favoring a minority faction by adding that measure to a bill 
containing other provisions favorable to other factions, so that each faction is forced to vote 
for another faction's m e m e  in order to obtain the passage of their own measwe. This 
arrangement often results in legishtion that is favorable to each of the powerful minority 
factions but unfavorabie to the broader interests of a majority of citizens.@ A frequently 
criticized variation on logrolling is porkbarrel lq$shtion. In porkbarrel legislation, each 
-7 
legislative district functions as a minority faction, and so long as a bill brings home enough 
porkbarre1 projects in tbe majority of legislative districts, a majority of legislators are happy 
ta vote for projects in other districts regardless of whether those projects are needed. 
In the 1990s, logrolling and p&arrel legishtion often appear as symptoms of the 
larger problem of "governmental gridlock." Governmend gridlock occurs when diffient 
factions within the legislam become so sharply divided that they are unwilling or unable to 
agree to compromises that truly benefit the majority of citizens. The result is that such 
sharply divided legislatures "fail to resolve -- or even respond to -- the problems felt by large 
,'- 
numbers of citizens. "" Absent the atmosphere of civility and consensus that would enable a 
majority of elected representatives to address such commonly felt problems, legislatures often 
resort to logrolling as the only means of amacting enough votes to pass a bill. 
Logrolling and porkbarrel legislation are by no means the only legislative procedures 
that facilitate domination by minority factions and perpetuate governmental gridlock. During 
the era of the progressive movement, critics of legislatures argued that "[tlheir proceedings 
involved too much secrecy, too little discussion, too much automatic passage of what 
r. 
legislative committees proposed."" In more recent years, these questionable legislative 
practices include influence-peddling by lobbyists, gerrymandering of legislative districts to 
allow domination by one political party or ethnic group, heavily guarded control of legislative 
committee assignments, sudden schedule changes and the many procedures by which 
legislators can pass or kill bills without deliberation or public notice." A common element of 
al l  these procedures is a lack of the kind of meaningful public participation that is necessary 
to give lawmaking the stamp of legitimacy. 
B. Bencfis of the Znitim've 
Some advocates in the progressive movement viewed the initiative as a replacement 
for the legislature. According to this view, representative government was no more than "a 
succession of 'quasi-oligarchies,' only indirectly and remotely responsible to the people. "66 
However, more recent proponents of the initiative regard it as merely a means of correcting 
the abuses that overreliance on the legislature or other elected officials has engendered - a 
means that "pose[s] no more of a threat to the representative principle than has judicial 
review or the executive veto. Like judicial review or the executive veto, what enables the 
? 
initiative process to correct these abuses is its independence from the legislature. Thus, 
according to one recent proponent, "[tjhe best case for direct legislation in a system of 
representative government is that it may play a role in just those areas in which institutional 
pressures cause representatives to stray from the interests of popular majorities: government 
structures and regulation of the political process, taxation, and spending. "" 
The history of the initiative in the United States is replete with examples that support 
this claim. In the area of government structures and regulation of the political process, the 
examples range from women's suffrage, which became law through the initiative in 
P. 
Colorado, Oregon and Arizona years before it reached the federal constitution,* to "motor 
voter" laws that register people to vote when they get a driver's l i cen~e ,~  to the more recent 
fascination with term limits." While California's Proposition 13 and more recent initiatives 
requiring voter approval of tax increases stand out as the most obvious examples of tax 
reform that became law through the initiative process,n lesser known examples in this area 
include a North Dakota initiative that doubled the state tax on oil production, and a Missouri 
initiative that increased the sales tax by one percent to generate new revenues for schools and 
r-. 
provide property tax relief." 
Not only do these examples show how the initiative allows citizens to get at issues that 
recalcitrant legislators, powerful committee chairs and headstrong governors are unwilling to 
address, they also show the kinds of innovation that initiatives have added to the political 
process. In bringing forth women's suffrage and "motor voters" laws years before such ideas 
became law at the federal level, the initiative may be viewed as "a happy incident of the 
federal system [in which] a single courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a 
laboratory; and try novel so~ial and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the 
country."" Indeed, some politicians argue the states' experiments with direct legislation have . , 
been such a success that it is time for Congress to provide for a national initiative.'* 
Even when the experiments performed by an initiative result in failure, they still 
provide grist for the legislative mill and have spillover effects on candidate campaigns, voter 
education and citizen participation. With regard to candidate campaigns, it is important to 
note how political candidates often sponsor initiative measures, hoping that voter's support 
for an initiative measure will spillover into their campaign for office. This strategy has been 
0, 
employed successfully by several of California's governors, from the criminal justice refoims 
of the Earl Warren era to Jeny Brown's involvement with the political reform initiative and 
George Deukmejian's sponsorship of the "Victim's Bill of Rights" initiative." The 
interaction of candidate campaigns with initiative propositions shows one way that the 
initiative process works together with representative government rather than against it. Even 
when candidates or elected officials oppose an initiative measure, the initiative may place an 
issue on the agenda and lead them to respond to it. 
hoponents of the initiative also argue that it serves to educate and draw participation 
from voters in ways that representative government cannot or has not. Some statistical 
evidence suggests that voter turnout is higher when initiatives appear on the ballot," but most 
scholars agree that the main benefits of the initiative with regard to citizen participation are 
qualitative." To the extent a law passed by initiative is more likely to take effect than a law 
that a political candidate promises to enact, initiative campaigns are more likely than 
candidate campaigns to produce immediate, tangible results such as lower taxes, harsher 
penalties for criminals, or legalized gambling. These direct consequences gives initiative 
,-- 
participants a greater sense that they can "make a differen~e."~ By allowing citizens to 
participate directly in the making of a law or constitutional amendment, the initiative also 
gives people a greater sense that they are governing themselves rather than being governed by 
outside forces beyond their control. This sense of empowerment and political self-control 
arguably increases the psychological and social well-being of the individuals participating in 
an initiative ~ a m p a i g n . ~  Because of these positive feelings that an initiative process 
engenders, the laws that result from this process may enjoy greater legitimacy with the 
public. 
A final corollary to the benefits of citizen participation is voter education. At a 
practical level, initiatives stir a public debate which results in greater awareness of underlying 
policy issues. To the extent initiatives remain issue-focused rather than becoming as 
personality-focused as candidate campaigns, they are in a better position to genuinely inform 
voters rather than just entertain them." At a more philosophical level, participation in 
initiative campaigns can perform an important educative function that the state's other 
-, 
educational institutions are not in a position to perform. To the extent these other institutions 
must remain value-neutral to comply with the establishment clause, multicultural norms or 
"political correctness," they leave to processes like the initiative the important function of 
teaching values and developing the intellectual and moral tools needed to act as a responsible 
citizen." As expressed by Thomas Jefferson: "I know of no safe repository of the ultimate 
power of society but the people, and if we think them not enlightened enough, the remedy is 
not to take the power from them, but to inform them by education."" This view of the 
relationship between education and popular sovereignty is central to the Jeffersonian faith in 
F' 
the will of the people -- a faith upon which the initiative is entirely premised. 
C. FImvs in the Traditional Initiative Process 
The traditional opponents of the initiative do not share this Jeffersonian faith. They 
see the initiative as more of a tool for deceiving or confusing the public than a source of 
education. They dispute that the presence of ballot initiatives has any quantifiable effect on 
voter turnout. And with regard to the qualitative effects on participation, opponents of the 
initiative argue that it limits access to the political process more than it promotes citizen 
participation in that process. 
The source of these problems, according to some critics, is an "initiative industry" 
that allows wealthy special interests simply to buy an initiative much like they would buy the 
vote of a legislator through campaign contributions or influence-peddling." Important to this 
criticism are data showing that ballot access is not easy: most initiative proponents fall short 
of gathering the number of signatures required to put their proposal on the ballot." The 
majority of initiatives that do appear on the ballot got there because their proponents hired 
paid, professional signature collectors." Critics charge that paid signature-gathering results in 
voter deception, and flagrant examples of such deception abound." Yet so far no state has '-'. 
devised a means of preventing the use of paid petition signature collectors that does not 
violate the First Amendment or free speech clauses in state con~titutions.~ 
Once an initiative qualifies to appear on the ballot, special interest groups affected by 
that initiative hire the initiative industry as media consultants to advertise their position. 
According to critics of the initiative process, these advertisements often use emotional appeals 
that play on people's fears or create confusion." When the task at hand is to defeat rui 
initiative that is overwhelmingly papular, opponents of that initiative hire the initiative 
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industry to create a counter-initiative that dilutes support for the original initiative, or simply 
confuses voters about the underlying issue so they will vote against both initiatives." Other 
techniques such as coalition-building and the burying of riders within an initiative suggest that 
the initiative process does not necessarily escape the practice of i~grolliig.~' 
The initiative industry is highly profitable, but relatively few groups can afford to hire 
the firms that make up this industry. By one critic's calculations, over $1 17 million were 
spent on ballot measures in 21 states in 1992.n The groups spending large sums of money on 
initiatives are the same special interests that initiative proponents accuse of defiling the 
,'-- 
legislatures. For example, the National Rifle Association and its bedfellows spent $6.8 
million on a gun control referendum in Maryland, and the tobacco industry recently spent $21 
million to oppose an increase in California's tobacco tax." 
Another element that the initiative industry seeks to control for its clients is the timing 
of initiatives. Where their polling indicates a favorable result can be obtained from an 
election with low voter turnout, the initiative industry will ensure that the issue is presented at 
a special election or primary election. Or, an initiative will be timed to coincide with an 
A 
election at which members of one political party or interest group have less of an incentive to 
vote. Such was the case with California's Proposition 13 - a property tax relief initiative 
that coincided with "a primary at which the Democratic party had no contested statewide 
party race for Governor, while the Republicans did."% Moreover, critics of the initiative 
point out that regardless of how the initiative industry attempts to manipulate the turnout at a 
particular election, the turnout in all elections is lower for voters who are young, who have 
lower incomes, or who have less education. The result is that "[vloting on ballot 
propositions only amplifies the social class bias in participation . . . .m In other words, 
..? 
"initiatives are not very representative. "96 
Another common criticism of the initiative and other forms of direct legislation is that 
they clutter the ballot with technical propositions that overwhelm the capacity of voters to 
comprehend and make rational decisions. This ballot clutter only aggravates the class bias 
problem because younger, poorer and less educated voters are more likely to be overwhelmed 
and confused." Several states, such as California, have attempted to control ballot clutter by 
distributing ballot initiatives more equally among special, primary and general elections, but 
- 
this procedure only makes initiatives more susceptible to turnout manipulation by the 
initiative industry. A related problem is that once a group of lengthy, technically worded 
constitutional initiatives receive the approval of the electorate, these initiatives proceed to 
clutter the state's constitution with material that arguably belongs elsewhere or is quickly 
outdated once the fad that drove a particular initiative campaign has passed. Based on data 
that indicate passage rates are virtually the same for statutory and constitutional initiatives, 
critics argue that it is too easy for initiative proponents to make their proposal into a 
- 
constitutional amendment rather than a statute.g" 
If they do not detract from a state's constitution because of their sheer volume and 
technical detail, initiatives still may liaer the document with language that is iU-conceived, 
poorly drafted or violative of the federal ~0XIStitution. Part of this criticism stems from the 
fact that many state constitutions "prohibit any one initiative from altering more than one 
article at a time, thereby preventing voters from using this method to fashion comprehensive 
revisions affecting several parts of the constit~tion."~~ Yet such prohibitions on 
r '  
comprehensive reform have not prevented citizens from using the initiative process to 
adversely affect the rights of minorities. The history of direct legislation is replete with 
examples of initiatives that may unconstitutionally denigrate minority rights: California's 
"open housing" initiative in 1964,Im the "English-only" initiatives that have appeared on the 
ballot in several states,lol the initiatives in Colorado and Oregon proposing to deprive gays 
and lesbians of equal protection under housing and employment discrimination laws,lm and 
California's latest proposals to deprive illegal immigrants of social ser~ices'~ and ban 
af f ia t ive  action.'"' 
Initiatives that denigrate minority rights also raise the specter of majority tyranny. 
Without the checks and bdances of the legislative process, the only restraints on the 
majoritarian excesses of the initiative process are the courts. Yet courts too are ultimately 
subject to the control of the majority. A M  ruling a series of initiatives unconstitutional 
during the 1960s and 1970s, three of California's Supreme Court justices were defated in the 
1986 judicial retention electi~ns.'~ The irony of this majoritxian excess is that the issues 
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which provoke it often are not really the chief concerns of a majority of citizens. Tn place of 
a broad agenda of issues that suly affect every citizen, the initiative directs the public's 
attention toward such specialized concerns as 'the rights of homosexuals, whether nondentists 
can prescribe dentures, or remictions on the hunting and trapping of black bears. "IM 
Some argue that initiatives undermine tbe very foundations of representative 
government when they divert the political agenda taward sucfi a narrow range of special 
issues. This argument was made most forcefully by the early critics of direct legislation, 
A 
such as President Taft: 
The effect of the initiative and referendum upon the legislative branch of the 
Government, even if it be retained, is necessarily to minimize its power, to take away 
its courage and independence of action, to destroy its sense of responsibility and to 
hold it up as unworthy of confidence. Nothing would more certainly destroy the 
character of a law-making body .Irn 
There is some evidence to support the claim that the efforts of political parties and candidates 
to articulate a broad legislative agenda have been subsumed by the need to respond to the 
special, narrow issues raised by initiative campaigns -- thereby decreasing the power of 
political parties and increasing the influence of single-issue groups that propose initiatives.'@ 
,n 
However, after several decades of experience with the initiative, it is clear that direct 
legislation has not brought about the collapse of representative government feared by the early 
critics. Hence, more recent critics of the initiative do not advocate eliminating direct 
legislation entirely .Iw 
The better criticism is not that initiatives destroy representative government, but that 
representative government has certain key values that enable it to make better law and avoid 
some mistakes that frequently arise in the initiative process. According to California 
Supreme Court Justice Stanley Mosk, "the flaws apparent to recent initiative measures would n 
have been caught if they had proceeded through the legislative process . . . a committee 
hearing in one house, debate on the floor of the house, committee hearings in the other 
house, debate on the floor; and the ultimate governor's opportunity to veto. ""O In the words 
of another critic: 
In the initiative process, the voter is only partially legislator. Voters generally are not 
permitted to participate in the drafting of initiatives, nor may they amend the measure, 
as legislators can. There are no hearings, markup, floor debate, or conference 
between the two houses to work out technical issues or modify the bill to make it 
more acceptable. Sponsors of initiatives rarely circulate their proposals before the 
petition phase, and once this phase begins, the language of the measure cannot 
change. Voters instead face an initiative crafted entirely by the sponsors on which 
they may only cast a "yes" or "no" vote."' 
-, 
Underlying the specific procedures that these critics articulate are several key values that h e  
legislative process seeks to foster: compromise, accommodation and, most of all, 
deliberation. These values are lacking from the traditional, direct initiative process. 
To restore these values to the initiative process, and thereby improve the quality of the 
laws and constitutional changes that result from this process, critics have offered several 
recommendations. Foremost among these recommendations is the idea that states should 
switch from the direct initiative process to an indirect procedure that includes a "cooling off 
period" during which the legislature can hold hearings, amend the initiative by supermajority p. 
vote, or at least vote on the initiative in some form before it appears on the ballot."' In 
addition to involving the legislature, some critics have suggested establishing a permanent 
constitutional commission to oversee the initiative process and placing greater reliance on the 
role of civil society in shaping this process.'I3 Other recommendations focus on increasing 
deliberation among the citizenry by requiring initiatives to have formal sponsors and allowing 
these sponsors to amend their initiative and seek drafting advice from an attorney general or 
other state official with the requisite expe~tise.~" To further differentiate statutory and 
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constitutional initiatives, it has been suggested that constitutional initiatives should require a 
supermajority or a majority in two separate elections, while statutory initiatives should enjoy 
no special, protected status vis-a-vis other  statute^."^ F i l y ,  critics of the traditional, direct 
initiative look to the courts to continue their active role in scnmnizing initiatives -- or even 
increase their scrutiny during the pre-election period.116 
The initiative process also can be changed to minimize the problem of voter deception 
and confusion. Recommendations in this area include: requiring initiative petitions to be 
accompanied by an official statement and summary of the petition's contents authored by a ? 
neutral party, ballot title requirements, and putting the full t e a  of the initiative on the 
ballot."' In order to reduce the ballot clutter that might result from such proposals, critics 
have suggested strictly enforcing the single-subject rule for initiatives, adding a 500-word 
limit to the length of proposed constitutional amendments, or even restricting initiatives to 
brief, general policy statements that guide implementation by the legi~lature.~~' Finally, 
despite the fact that many voters cannot or will not read them, some critics have encouraged 
the publication of voter's pamphlets to increase voter understanding of what is on the 
Still other recommendations focus on loosening the grip of the initiative industry. In 
the area of prerequisites to ballot qualification, some have suggested lengthening the 
circulation period to allow volunteers to compete with paid petitioners, adding geographic 
distribution requirements and exacting strict penalties from those who engage in deceptive 
petitioning.'" As a check on the financing of initiative campaigns, it is suggested that states 
impose mandatory financial disclosure requirements on those spending money to support or 
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oppose an initiative, including disclosure of names and affiliations of campaign contributors, 
and provide public financing to establish a floor for campaign expenditures.lZ1 To control 
advertising about initiatives, one critic has suggested a return to the fairness doctrine in media 
coverage, and the imposition of stiff penalties for false advertising.lP Finally, to prevent the 
initiative industry from manipulating voter turnout on initiatives, there is a recommendation 
that constitutional initiatives only be voted on at general elections and not at primaries or 
special elections.lu 
IV. A PROPOSAL FOR A NEW FORM OF CONSTITUTIONAL INITIATIVE 
Despite its flaws, the traditional, direct initiative has become a primary vehicle for 
channeling public discontent and attacking problems that representative institutions fail to 
resolve. However, such public discontent and the attacks it engenders are not limited to the 
eighteen states in which the use of the initiative is constitutionally authorized. There is ample 
evidence of deep discontent with representative government in other states, and this discontent 
spans both ends of the political spectrum. For example, in New Mexico -- one of the 
minority of western states in which the initiative is not authorized -- citizens in some rural 
counties have rebelled against existing representative institutions by enacting county 
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IV. A PROPOSAL FOR A NEW FORM OF CONSTITUTIONAL INITIATIVE 
Despite its flaws, the traditional, direct initiative has become a primary vehicle for 
channeling public discontent and attacking problems that representative institutions fail to 
resolve. However, such public discontent and the attacks it engenders are not limited to the 
eighteen states in which the use of the initiative is constitutionally authorized. There is ample 
evidence of deep discontent with representative government in other states, and this discontent 
spans both ends of the political spectrum. For example, in New Mexico -- one of the 
minority of western states in which the initiative is not authorized -- citizens in some rural 
counties have rebelled against existing representative institutions by enacting county 
ordinances and land use plans which purport to preempt state and federal law and return 
broad governmental powers to the local level.lu While courts have found such ordinances 
and land use plans ~nconstitutional,'~ the "county movement" spawned by nual New 
Mexicans continues to spread to other states.'" At the other end of the political spectrum, 
New Mexico now has a third major political party, the Greens, and this new party's 
gubernatorial candidate obtained close to eleven percent of the vote in the 1994 election.In A 
fundamental element of the Green's political platform is "grassroots democracy," and the 
party's counterpart in Gennany repeatedly has called for a national initiative lawmaking 
process in that ~ o u n b y . ' ~  
The rising call for grassroots democracy exemplified by the county movement and the 
Green Party suggests that many of the thirty two states which currently lack a procedure for 
amending their constitution by citizen's initiative are ripe for a new method of bringing about 
constitutional change. To provide a check on abuses of power by elected representatives, and 
to construct a channel through which popular discontent may flow, these states should 
consider amending their constitutions so that their citizens may initiate changes to the state's 
constitution. In formulating such amendments, lawmakers should begin by learning from the 
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mistakes that other states have made in their initiative process as well as the recommendations 
of the various scholars and commissions that have studied the subject. The proposed 
constitutional amendment attached to this article as an appendix is an attempt to do just that. 
This proposed amendment is built around six central principles that provide the foundation 
necessary to shore up the weaknesses in the traditional, direct initiative process while 
reinforcing the proven strengths of this process. 
1 The initiative should supplement and not replace the legislature's 
capacity for proposing constitutrtutronal amendments. 
P 
The first sentence of the proposed amendment states that the people's power to 
propose and ratify constitutional amendments by initiative shall be in addition to the existing 
methods provided elsewhere in this article. This language is intended to allow the legislature 
to continue its current practice of proposing constitutional amendments and submitting them 
to the electmate for ratification. In addition to this current practice, the legislature will be 
able to take part in the initiative process by appointing two individuals to serve on the 
independent commission charged with overseeing this process. 
The new language in the proposed amendment does not preclude the legislature from 9 
making a proposal that conflicts with an initiative scheduled to appear on the same ballot, nor 
does this language prevent the legislature from proposing a change to a constitutional 
provision that previously became law through the initiative process. Legislative proposals 
that conflict with initiatives are accommodated by subsections (I) and (J) of the proposed 
amendment. Subsection (I) provides that when two or more conflicting amendments appear 
on the same ballot and both receive the required number of votes, then only the amendment 
receiving the higher number of votes shall become law. Subsection (J) provides that when 
two or more amendments, whether initiated by the people or proposed by the legislature, are 
submitted to the .voters, each shall appear on the ballot in a manner that allows voters to vote 
on each of them separately. These subsections are intended to ensure that legislative 
proposals remain distinct from initiated amendments on the ballot, so that voters have a clear 
choice among them. However, the separate voting provision is not intended to limit 
initiatives to a single subject. 
P. Finally, subsection (K) makes clear that there are two subject areas in which the 
power to amend the constitution by initiative is restricted. The first of these areas is minority 
rights. The second is the constitutional initiative process itself. The latter restriction is 
intended to prevent the new language in the proposed amendment from opening the door to 
further amendments that infringe upon the legislature's capacity to institute constitutional 
change. 
2. An independent, constitWrtWronal commission should be utilized 
to add deliberation and balance to the initiative process. 
Subsection (A) of the proposed amendment provides for the creation of an independent 
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commission to oversee the initiative process. The composition of this commission is intended 
to be diverse and inclusive, with expertise and experience drawn from each branch of state 
govenunent, each major political party and each congressional district. This diversity and 
inclusiveness is intended to prevent the commission from being dominated or captured by a 
single branch of government, political party or special interest group. The duties of the 
commission are to receive, consider and vote upon initiatives submitted by the people. These 
duties are canied out by providing technical assistance to initiative sponsors, approving the 
form of initiatives, holding public hearings, receiving written comments, ruling on proposed .? 
modifications and conflicts among proposed amendments, voting and expressing opinions on 
the merits of initiatives, and arranging for the publication of voter information about 
initiatives. The central purpose behind all of the commission's duties is to facilitate 
deliberation upon initiatives and thereby improve their quality. These duties are not intended 
to serve as a mechanism for obstructing or detracting from initiatives submitted by the 
people. 
By referring citizen's initiatives to a constitutional commission instead of the 
legislature, the proposed amendment departs from the indirect initiative processes recently - 
proposed in California and enacted in Mississippi. There are several reasons for this 
departure. F i ,  the commission is intended to be an independent body performing a special, 
constitutional function that is separate and distinct from those functions performed by other 
branches of government. If tbis independent body and its functions were subsumed by the 
legislature, then its ability to serve as a check on legislative abuses would be diminished. 
The diversity needed to protect the commission from domination or capture by special 
interests also would be diminished if it were merely a component of the legislature. Officials 
from other branches of government might not be able to serve on a constitutional commission 
that was an arm of the legisiative branch without raising serious concerns about separation of 
powers, and the commission would be more subject to control by the majority patty in the 
legislature. The use of an. indqmdent commission is intended to answer 'these concerns by 
distinguishing the constitutiomd initiative function from those functions performed by the 
legislative branch. 
There are also several practical concerns that motivate the decision to base the 
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~nstitutional initiative process in an independent commission instead of the legislature. One 
of these concerns is  the recent rise in the use of counter initiatives that simulate the language 
of an original initiative while cbanging certain key provisions. Recent studies show that the 
effect of such counter initiatives is to dilute support for the originid initiative or make voters 
confwd by the similarity between the two initiatives." If initiatives were sent to the 
legislature before appearing on the ballot, then there is a high risk that the legisfators will 
'acilitate the manufacture of such deceptive counter-iaitiative~.~ If given the oppmoity, it 
is dso likely that legislators will engage in logrolling by attaching riders to constitutional 
initiatives. "' 
Anorher concern is whether the legislature is in a position to carry the burden imposed 
by the duty to receive, consider and vote upon initiatives. The Senate Constitutional 
Amendments Committee in California recently objected to a proposal that would require it to 
hold hearings and make recommendations on cdtutional initiatives, noting that such 
requirements "could be cumbersome when numerous initiatives are certified, ar when s e v d  
competing initiatives have qualified that take conflicting stands on the m e  subject matter. ""' 
The Committee sought to avoid this burden by suggesting that its practice of hotding hearings ---\ 
and making recommendations on initiatives should be permissive rather thm 
However, by permitting some initiatives to pass without any bearings or recommendations, 
this suggestion would detract from the fundamental goal of making the initiative process more 
deliberative. 
A final concern with running the initiative process through the legislature is that the 
legislative agenda is already full, and there already are too many m a s u e s  that either pass or 
die without deliberation in the relatively short legislative sessions to which some states are 
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limited. The legislature and the governor in some states already have difficulty performing 
such basic legislative functions as passing a budget and appropriating funds. Imposing an 
additional duty to consider initiatives could divert the legislature from these basic functions 
and instead require legislators to spend an inordinate amount of time on highly controversial 
but less consequential issues such as bear hunting, insurance rates or the morality of 
homosexual behavior.'% 
3. Thc sponsors of an initimive should have the power 
to withdraw or propose modifications to an initiated 
constirutional amendment before it appears on the ballot. 
Subsection (C) of the proposed amendment requires that a petition to initiate a 
constitutional amendment be sponsored by twenty or more registered voters who shall serve 
as the sponsoring committee for that initiative. Aside from its possible effect of keeping 
frivolous initiatives off the ballot, the purpose of this initiative is twofold. First, it 
establishes an identifiable group of citizens that is ultimately responsible for an initiative. 
Second, and more importantly, requiring a sponsoring committee to initiate constitutional 
amendments provides a means for engaging civil society in the initiative process. It is 
contemplated that such sponsoring committees often will consist of church groups, community 
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organizations, labor unions, and other special institutions that "stand between the public and 
private sectors - and have elements of both. "IU While the proposed amendment does not 
attempt to establish detailed rules of order for conducting the business of a sponsoring 
committee, it is contemplated that sponsoring c o m r n i ~  will work as quasi-legislative bodies 
and hold public meetings in which they deliberate about bow to craft their initiative. 
Subsection (F) provides that the authority to withdraw or modify an amendment 
proposed by initiative shall vest in the sponsoring committee after the public has been given 
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the opporlunity to speak at public hearings and submit written comments on that amendment. 
While there is no requirement that the sponsoring committee review or comment upon the 
feedback received at public hearings or in writing, the intent behind this subsection is that the 
sponsoring committee's decision to withdraw, modify or take no action on their original 
initiative will be a carefully considered response to the public comments received by the 
commission. 
Since modification by the sponsoring committee will occur after all the signatures 
supporting the initiated amendment and all public comments have been gathered, certain 
safeguards are needed to prevent the sponsoring committee from departing from the wishes of 
the supporters who signed the petition. Subsection (F) answers this concern by requiring the 
sponsoring committee's modification to remain within the scope and purpose of the original 
initiative. The commission has the authority to finally determine whether this requirement is 
met. 
The commission also has the authority to issue additional rules governing the 
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withdrawal and modification process. This rulemaking authority is based on the recognition 
that the withdrawal or modification process is an experimental one that has not been tried in 
other states. To respond to unforeseen consequences of this experimental process, the 
commission needs the option of resorting to administrative rulemaking in Lieu of asking the 
legislature for an amendment to the constitutional language in subsection (F). However, to 
prevent abuse of this rulemaking authority, the commission's adminimative rulemaking is 
made subject to judicial review under the state's administrative procedure act. 
Subsection (F) departs from the indirect initiative process recently enacted in 
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Mississippi because it vests the authority to modify an initiated amendment in the sponsors of 
that amendment rather than the governmental body charged with considering the initiative. 
This departure reflects a belief that the power to modify an initiative belongs in the hands of 
the people who originally drafted it. To do otherwise would undermine the public confidence 
and sense of empowerment that the initiative process is meant to inspire. If a governmental 
body were allowed to modify citizen initiatives, then the door would be open for initiative 
opponents or special interests to attach riders or other provisions that would render an 
initiative unworkable, defeat its purpose and ultimately make the initiative process futile. 
While riders and other harmful provisions might be prevented by the requirement that a 
modification must remain within the scope and purpose of the original initiative, the 
effectiveness of this requirement would be diminished if the authority to decide whether it is 
met is vested in the same body that proposed the harmful modification in the first place. 
Subsection (F) avoids this problem by separating the power to propose modifications from the 
power to determine whether such moditications meet the original scope and purpose 
requirement. The sponsoring committee has the former power, while the commission has the 
/? 
latter. 
4. The initiative process should be structured to limit undue influence 
by the initiative industry and encourage citizen pam'cipation. 
The proposed amendment contains several provisions aimed at minimizing inequalities 
between well-funded, industry-sponsored initiative campaigns and volunteer efforts canied 
out by citizens groups. Subsection (C) requires sponsors of an initiative to present it to the 
commission or its designated representative before officially circulating any petitions. The 
commission must approve the form of the initiative before it is officially circulated. The 
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intent of this requirement is to provide an opportunity for citizens to receive technical 
assistance in drafting an initiative and to ensure that initiative petitions circulated to voters are 
not deceptive, misleading or incomprehensible. However, except for the requirement that 
petitions be printed in both Spanish and English,'% the formal requirements for an initiative 
petition are left for the commission to determine under its own rulemaking authority. Such 
requirements could include disclosure of finances and identification of the contributors that 
are funding an initiative campaign. Regulation of the time, place and manner in which an 
approved petition is circulated also is left for the commission to determine under its 
rulemaking authority. While it should never result in the kind of unfettered discretion that 
could raise First Amendment concerns, this rulemaking authority gives the commission some 
much-needed flexibility to accommodate volunteer initiatives and respond to manipulation by 
the initiative industry as the need arises. 
Once an initiative petition is approved for circulation, subsections (C) and (D) of the 
proposed amendment establish certification requirements which strike a balance between the 
need to limit the ballot to serious, well-supported proposals and the desire to accommodate 
volunteer efforts by reducing the demand for paid signature-collectors. Subsection (D) 
requires the signatures of eight percent of the registered voters in the state. This requirement 
is equal to the percentage of voters required under the California, Florida and Oregon 
Constitutions but is less than the ten to fifteen percent requirement found in most state 
constitutions that provide for citizens initiatives. Although volunteer organizations have 
found it difficult to get their initiatives on the ballot even in states with the eight percent 
requirement, the commission may use its rulemaking authority under subsection (C) to reduce 
this difficulty by, for example, lengthening the amount of time available to collect signatures 
f- 
on an initiative petition. 
The eight percent requirement is coupled with a geographic distribution requirement of 
two percent of the registered voters in each congressional district. The geographic 
distribution requirement is intended to make initiative campaigns a truly statewide effort and 
reduce undue influence by voters in the large, urbanized areas of the state. However, the 
geographic distribution requirements are kept to a minimum to avoid placing obstacles in the 
path of citizens groups that lack the resources to mount an extensive, statewide circulation 
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effort. Manipulation of voter turnout is controlled to some extent by the requirement in 
subsection (H) that initiatives shall appear on the ballot at general elections only. There is no 
provision for voting on initiatives at special elections or primaries. 
The activities of the commission laid out in subsections (E) through (G) are intended 
to provide an additional layer of protection against manipulation of the initiative process by 
unduly influential special interest groups. The commission guarantees public hearings and 
votes on every initiated amendment that is the subject of a certified petition. The 
commission's hearings are intended to provide both a spotlight in which deceptive appeals 
may be uncovered and a level playing field on which all participants can compete for the 
attention of the media and the public. By voting and expressing their opinions on initiated 
amendments, the members of the commission can serve as opinion leaders and, in that 
capacity, may offset the impacts of "hired guns" retained for the purpose of directing public 
opinion. 
The commission's voting power on initiatives also is intended to control the influence 
of tyrannical factions and serve as a check on collective passions. Although not subject to 
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judicial review on their merits, votes by the commission are intended to be reasoned decisions 
that result from careful consideration of the arguments presented at public hearings and in 
written comments. Subsection (H) provides that when a majority of the commission votes in 
opposition to an initiative, then that initiative must receive a two-thirds supermajority of the 
votes cast in the next general election in order to become part of the constitution. This 
provision is intended to restrain the ability of special interests to use high spending, 
emotionally manipulative campaign tactics to force the passage of an initiative that is 
otherwise meritless or contrary to the public interest. Among the types of initiatives that are 
,p. 
most vulnerable to opposition by the commission are initiatives that embrace more than one 
subject,'" deceptive counter initiatives'" and initiatives that denigrate minority rights.13' 
In addition to its restraining effect on tyrannical factions and collective passions, 
subsection (H) is designed to avoid concentrating too much power in the commission itself. 
In particular, subsection (H) does not go so far as to allow the commission through its voting 
power to keep initiatives off the ballot entirely. Data from several states shows that some 
initiatives can meet the two-thirds supermajority requirement that subsection (H) may 
- 
impose.'" If a potentially unconstitutional initiative such as California's Proposition 187 were 
to obtain the votes of a supemajority, opponents of that initiative ultimately would have to 
seek relief in court. 
5.  The initiative process should actively promote wter educaiion. 
The proposed amendment provides for voter education at several stages within the 
initiative process. In requiring initiative sponsors to seek approval as to fonn from the 
commission, subsection (C) provides the commission or its designated representative with an 
opportunity to give technical assistance to spollso~s who are trying to draft an initiative. 
While this subsection leaves some room for the commission to decide in what fonn an 
initiative must appear in order to be approved for circulation, its basic purpose is to put 
initiative petitions in a form that promotes voter comprehension and provides a level of 
information about the initiative that is sufficient to support informed decisionmaking by 
voters. Subsection (C) does not go so far as to prescribe penalties for circulating an 
unapproved petition or obtaining petition signatures by fraud or deceit, but that is an obvious 
topic for implementing legislation or administrative rulemaking. 
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The public hearing process provides another forum for voter education. The proposed 
amendment does not specifically provide for open meetings or public inspection of the 
commission's records, but it is assumed that the commission's meetings and records must be 
open to the public in order to comply with existing freedom-of-information and 
government-in-the-smhine statutes. After the public comment period, subsection (G) 
permits commission members, at their discretion, to accompany their votes with a concise 
written opinion. 
The opinions of the commission are intended to resemble something inbetween a court 
/-' 
opinion and a legislative committee report. Like the decisionmaking of a court, it is 
anticipated that commission members will join with other members to form majority, plurality 
or dissenting opinions. However, reaching such opinions is not intended to be a secretive 
process, and there is no constitutional restriction on commission members expressing their 
opinions outside of commission meetings or engaging in a pane communications with 
initiative sponsors or other groups.''' In this respect, commission members are more like the 
legislators who author a committee report. Also, in contrast to both judicial opinions and 
r 
committee reports, commission members are encouraged to write their opinions in language 
that is both brief and comprehensible so that they may be understood by the electorate. 
Subsection (G) provides that commission members may publish their opinions in a manner 
provided by law. As with the requirements for formal approval of a petition under 
subsection (C), the proposed amendment leaves room for the commission or the legislature to 
determine what material should be published, and in what fonn this material should 
6 .  The initiative should not be used to denigrate the r i g h  of minorities. 
Subsection (K) of the proposed amendment states that the people's power to initiate 
constitutional amendments shall not be used to denigrate the constitutional rights of 
minorities. This restriction is intended as a check on collective passions and majority 
tyranny. Subsection (K) is phrased as a general but enforceable policy statement that should 
guide the decisionmaking of the commission and any court that is called to review the 
constitutionality of an initiative.'" The commission should interpret this policy statement as 
an almost per se rule that initiatives which denigrate minority rights require a "no" vote, thus 
-\, 
triggering the twethiirds supermajority requirement provided in subsection (H). ~ o w e v g ,  
the restriction in subsection (K) is not intended to give the commission the power to strike an 
initiative from the ballot on the grounds that it will denigrate minority rights. That power, as 
well as the power to strike an anti-minority initiative from the state constitution after it is 
enacted, is reserved to the courts. 
The general policy statement in subsection (K) was chosen in lieu of more specific 
prohibitions on repealing existing portions of the constitution that protect individual rights or 
elective franchise. This choice is premised on a concern that the inclusion of specific 
/? 
prohibitions could imply that any right not specifically mentioned is fair game for an 
anti-minority initiative. It is not possible to anticipate al l  the minority rights that might be 
implicated by an initiative and list them in subsection (K); it is equally impossible to specify 
all of the rights that might fall outside of the protection afforded by this subsection. 
However, the language in subsection (K) is limited to minority rights that are constitutionally 
recognized at the state, tribal or federal level. This subsection is not intended to create new 
rights for minorities, except for the limited right to be protected from initiatives that take 
.P.. 
away other existing constitutional rights. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Our nation now has almost a century of experience with constitutional initiatives. 
That experience has produced many benefits which suggest that the initiative process is 
worthy of retaining in some form. Our century of experience also has revealed serious flaws 
in the traditional initiative process. In recent years, legal scholars, constitutional study 
commissions and social scientists have carefully identified many of these flaws and 
recommended changes aimed at fixing them. However, no state has yet ratified a 
constitutional amendment that successfully implements these recommendations. 
This article attempts to carry the work of these scholars and commissions a step 
further by transforming their recommendations into a proposed constitutional amendment that 
provides a new method of bringing about constitutional change. This new method allows the 
kind of direct democratic process associated with the traditional initiatives of the past century 
but channels this process through the work of an independent, constitutional commission. 
The proposed constitutional amendment that results from this article is not intended to stand 
alone. Further work is required to develop implementing legislation and administrative 
rulemaking for this amendment. In addition, the constitutional initiative process proposed in 
this article needs to be paired with another constitutional amendment providing a similar 
process for enacting statutory changes. 
APPENDIX: A PROPOSED CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT 
Section -. [Initiating and ratifying amendments.] 
In addition to the methods of constitutional amendment provided elsewhere in this 
article, the people of this state reserve unto themselves the power to propose and ratify 
constitutional amendments by initiative subject to the following procedures and restrictions: 
(A) Citizen's Commission on Constitutional Amendment. .An independent 
commission to consist of nine members is hereby created, which shall be known as the 
"Citizen's Commission on Constitutional Amendment" or "CCCA." The CCCA shall be 
/- 
composed of six appointed members and three elected members. Each of the following state 
officials shall appoint one person to serve as a member of the CCCA: the Speaker of the 
House of Representatives; the President Pro Tempore of the Senate; the Governor; the 
Anomey General; the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court; and the Chief Judge of the Court 
of Appeafs. No more thao three of the appointed members of the CCCA shall be from the 
same political party. Registered electors shall elect three members of the CCCA from 
single-member districts. Such districts shall coincide with the state's congressional districts 
unless otherwise apportioned by law. Elected members of the CCCA may not simultaneously 
-, 
hold another elected state office. All members of the CCCA shall serve for a term of four 
years from the date they are elected or appointed. Except as specified in this constitution, the 
CCCA shall prescribe its own rules of order and procedure in accordance with the State 
Administrative Procedure Act. The legislature shall provide suitable quarters for the CCCA, 
appropriate funds for its lawful expenses and compensate its members for their services. 
(B) Duties and Powers of the Commission. It is the duty of the CCCA to 
receive, consider and vote upon initiatives to amend this constitution submitted by the people 
-, 
of this state. The CCCA shall have the powers necessary to carry out these duties. 
(C) Approval and Circulation of Pmmtions. A petition to initiate a constitutional 
amendment must be sponsored by twenty or more registered electors who shall serve as the 
sponsoring committee for that initiative. Such a petition must be approved as to form by the 
CCCA or its designated representative before it may be officially circulated. The CCCA 
shall issue rules governing the form of a petition, the frequency with which it may be 
submitted, and the time, place and manner of its circulation, except that all approved 
r' 
petitions mus be printed in both English and Spanish. 
Certification of Petitions. After circulating an approved petition, the 
sponsoring committee shall submit it to the Secretary of State for certification. The Secretary 
of State shall certify an approved petition if that petition was signed by eight percent of the 
registered electors in the State, including at least two percent of the registered electors in each 
congressional district, and the signatures were collected in accordance with law. The number 
of registered electors who signed the petition shall be measured as a percentage of the total 
/- 
number of votes cast for all candidates for Governor in the last gubernatorial election. The 
Secretary of State shall verify that each petitioner is a registered elector in a manner 
prescribed by law. 
(E) Public Hearings. The Secretary of State shall promptly file certified petitions 
with the CCCA. The CCCA shall promptly provide public notice, hold public hearings and 
receive written comments on each initiated constitutional amendment that is the subject of a 
certified petition. 
(F) Withdrawal or Modification. Following public hearings and the opportunity 0, 
to comment on an initiated constitutional amendment that is the subject of a certified petition, 
the amendment's sponsoring committee shall have the opportunity to withdraw or modify that 
amendment. Any such modification must remain within the scope and purpose of the original 
initiative. The CCCA by a majority vote shall make the final determination as to whether the 
sponsoring committee's modification falls within the scope and purpose of the original 
initiative and may issue rules governing the withdrawal or modification of initiated 
amendments consistent with this article. 
(G) Votes and Opinions of the Commission. Following the opportunity to " 
withdraw or modify an initiated constitutional amendment and the CCCA's final 
determination regarding any modification proposed by the sponsoring committee, the CCCA 
promptly shall vote either in favor of, or in opposition to, the initiated amendment as a 
whole. Each CCCA member may accompany his or her vote on an initiative with a concise 
written opinion, and the CCCA may cause these opinions to be published as provided by law. 
(H) Submittal to the Electorate. Following the CCCA's fmal vote on an 
initiative to amend the constitution, that initiative shall be placed on the ballot at the next 
general election. If a majority of the CCCA has voted in favor of an initiative, then that 
initiative must receive a majority of the votes cast on the initiative in the general election in 
order to become part of the constitution. If a majority of the CCCA has voted in opposition 
to an initiative, then that initiative must receive at least two-thuds of the votes cast on the 
initiative in the general election in order to become part of the constitution. 
(I) Conflcting Amendments. The CCCA by a majority vote shall make the fmaI 
r 
determination as to whether an initiated amendment conflicts with any other constitutionai 
amendment question that is scheduled to appear on the same ballot. If two or more 
conflicting amendment questions receive the number of votes required to become part of the 
constitution, then only the amendment receiving the greater number of votes shall become 
part of the constitution. 
(J) Separate Voting. If two or more amendments, whether proposed by the 
legislature or initiated by the people, are submitted to the voters at the same election, then 
such amendments shall appear on the ballot in a manner that allows voters to vote on each of n 
them separately. This subsection shall not be construed to require that an initiated 
amendment embrace no more than one subject. 
(K) R e ~ c z i o m .  Neither this article nor any other conslitutional provision 
regarding amendment of this constitution shall be subject to the people's power to initiate 
constitutional amendments. The people's power to initiate constitutional amendments shall 
not be used to denigrate the constitutional rights of minorities. 
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plans and ordinances. Miller, supra note 124, at 891: see also 
Scott W. Reed, The County Supremacy Movement: Mendacious Myth 
Marketing, 30 ID-o L. REV. 525 (1994). Members of the county 
movement have conducted initiative and referendum campaigns with 
a mild degree of success in states where such campaigns are 
possible. Recent examples include the property rights 
initiatives and referenda in Arizona and Washington. See Kim 
Murphy, Northwest's Landmark Land War: Washington's Voters Could 
Make Government Pay for Any Action that Hurts Property Values, 
LOS &-E-9 TIMES,  Oct. 28, 1995, at Al; Steve Yozwiak, 
r- Proposition 300: Private Property Rights Protection Act Puts 
State in National Spotlight, &I=. R~PUB=IC, NOV. 2, 1994, at 10. 
117 Joseph Skinner, Green Party Revival: New Mexico, T.IE 
P~oonass~vE, May 1995, at 14. 
118  SCHMIDT, supra note 14, at 173-74; see also CH.=.RLENE 
SPRE-AX & FRIT-P CAP-, &=EN POLITICS (1986). A recent 
example from the United States is the Green Party's campaign for 
a referendum on logging in Maine. See Andrew Kekacs, Vote to Ban 
Clear-Cutting Sought: Maine Green Party Claims Enough Support to 
Get Question on '96 Ballot, B-QOR DAILY NEWS, NOV. 16, 1995. 
129 See Magleby, Let the Voters Decide, supra note 76, at 
24 n.46. 
110 The proposed amendment reduces this risk but does not 
eliminate it. The legislature may still pass its own legislative 
,? 
proposal that serves the same function as a counter initiative. 
However, such a proposal.cannot masquerade as an atamendment" of 
an initiative. 
131 In this respect, the rationale for not allowing the 
legislature to amend initiatives parallels the rationale for not 
allowing the legislature to amend revisions proposed by a 
constitutional revision commission. See NMCRC, supra note 33, at 
101. 
13.2 Cal. Comm. Rpt. on Senate Const. Amend. No. 22, 1995-96 
Regular Session (1995). 
133 Id. 
134 See Magleby, Let the Voters Decide, supra note 76, at 
37. . -. .. 
IIS Gais & Benjamin, supra note 7, at 1313. 
136 This requirement is intended to avoid the effect of 
recent court rulings that allowed aaEnglish-onlyla initiative 
petitions on the grounds that the initiative process is not 
protected by the federal Voting Rights Act. See Delgado v. 
Smith, 861 F.2d 1489 (11th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 918 
(1989); Montero v. Meyer, 861 F.2d 603 (10th Cir. 1988), cert. 
denied, 492 U.S. 921 (1989). 
130 The proposed amendment does not impose a single-subject 
requirement on initiated amendments. However, it is certainly 
within the commission's discretion to consider the number of 
subjects that an initiative embraces in deciding whether to 
oppose it. There are two main reasons why the single subject 
,f- 
requirement was omitted from the proposed amendment. First, such 
a requirement may impose an arbitrary barrier to comprehensive 
reform. Second, there are no clear standards for enforcing such 
a requirement. See Marks, supra note 31, at 1289 (commenting on 
Florida's struggle to interpret its single-subject requirement). 
Hence, the requirement is superfluous and probably amounts to the 
same thing as allowing the commission to exercise its discretion. 
1311 For criticism of counter initiatives, see Magleby, Let 
the Voters Decide, supra note 76, at 24. 
139 Subsection (K) of the proposed amendment specifically 
prohibits initiatives that denigrate the constitutional rights of 
minorities. However, the commission has some discretion in 
, defining what denigrates minority rights, and the question is 
ultimately to be decided by the courts. 
1.0 See SCHMIDT, supra note 14, at 287-94. Notably absent 
from the list of initiatives that obtained the votes of 
supermajorities are California's Proposition 187, see LULAC v. 
Wilson, 908 F. Supp. 755, 763 (C.D. Cal. 1995) (passed by a vote 
of 59% to 41%), and Colorado's anti-gay initiative. See Romer v. 
Evans, 882 P.2d 1335, 1338 (Colo. 1994) (passed by a vote of 
53.4% to 46.6%), cert. granted, 115 S. Ct. 1092 (1995). 
1. Lobbying and ex parte communications could be the 
subject of administrative rulemaking or implementing legislation, 
however. 
1 4 2  For additional guidance, the commission and the courts 
may turn to Justice Lindels recent listing of initiatives that n 
are suspect because they target minorities. See Linde, supra 
note 4, at 41-42. However, the restrictions in subsection (K) do 
not spring from Justice Lindels argument that anti-minority 
initiatives violate the guarantee clause of the U.S. 
Constitution. 
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TABLE 2: CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT BY CITIZEN'S INITIATIVE IN EIGHTEEN STATES 1 
State 
Arizona Const. 
art, IV, pt, 1; 
art. XXI, 8 1 
Arkansas Const. 
amend. VII 
California Const. 
art. 11, $0 8, 10; 
art. XV1u' 
Colorado Const. 
art. V, 0 I; 
art. XIX 
Florida Const. 
art. XI 
Illinois Const. 
art. XIV 
Petition Process 
Petition by 15% of 
qualified electors filed 
with Sec'y of State 4 mos. 
before election. 
Petition by 10% of legal 
voters filed with Sec'y of 
State 4 mos. before 
election, including 5% of 
voters in 15 counties; no 
prohibition on paying 
people to collect 
signatures. 
Petition by 8% of electors 
Bled with Sec'y of State at 
least 13 1 days before 
election; petition must be 
submitted to AG before 
circulation. 
Petition by 5% of voters 
filed with Sec'y of State at 
least 3 months prior to 
election. 
Petition by 8% of voters, 
including 8% of votes 
cast in half of cong. 
districts 
Petition by 8% of voters 
filed with Sec'y of State at 
least 6 months before 
election. 
Form 
Court implies single 
subject rule from general 
provision requiring 
separate votes on each 
amendment. 
AG prepares title and 
summary prior to 
circulation of petition; 
initiative measure may 
not embrace more than 
one subject. 
Single subject 
requirement, 
One subject rule. 
Content 
Exception to one subject 
rule for amends. limiting 
power of gov't to raise 
revenue. 
Limited to structnral and 
procedural subjects 
contained in legislative 
article. 
Publication 
Same as for other 
proposed const. amends. 
Petitioners must publish 
in paper 30 days before 
filing at their own 
expense. 
Ballot information 
booklet published by 
nonpartisan research staff 
of General Assembly. 
Other 
Neither governor nor 
legislature can veto, 
repeal or amend; 
provisions are 
selfexecnting. 
Governor cannot veto and 
legislature cannot amend 
or repeal. 
Legislature created com'n 
to review initiative 
process in 1991. 
No veto or amendment by 
legislature; newly added 
section requiring 60% 
appmval. 
Requires three-fiflhs 
majority of those voting 
on amendment or 
majority of those voting 
in election. 
TI 1 E 2: CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT BY CITIZEI. INITIATIVE IN EIGHTEEN STATES 1 '2 
State 
Massachusetts 
Const. 
pt' 2' 6' art' 
amend. art. 
XLVIlI 
Michigan Const. 
art. XII, 4 2 
Mississippi Const. 
art, XIV, 5 273 
Missouri Const. 
art, 111, $5 49-53; 
art. XI1 
Montana Const. 
art. 111, 5 4; 
art. XIV 
Petition Process 
Petition by 10 voters to 
AG for review, then 3% 
of voters with no more 
than one fourth from one 
county, then to 
legislature. 
Petition by 10% or 
registered electors filed as 
authorized by law. 
Petition by 12% of 
qualified voters in a 
12-month pcriod, no 
more than one fiRh fmm 
one cong. district, filed 
w/ Sec'y of State, who 
then files with 
legislature. 
Petition by 8% of legal 
voters in each of 
two-thirds of the cong. 
districts filed with Sec'y 
of State at least 4 months 
before elenion. 
Petition by 10% of 
qualified electors 
including 10% in each of 
wo-fifths of cong. dists. 
filed with Secl of State. 
Form 
Only subjects which are 
related or are mutually 
dependent, 
Must contain 100-word 
statement of purpose. 
Sponsor must identify 
amount, source, reduction 
andlor reallocation of 
revenue required to 
implement the initiative; 
legislative budget officer 
also does fiscal analysis. 
Must contain enacting 
clause and full text of 
measure; may not contain 
more than one amended 
and revised article of 
constitution or one new 
article concerning not 
more than one subject. 
Petitions must contain 
full text of proposed 
amendment. 
Content 
List of subjects excluded 
from initiative includes: 
religion, judges, 
appropriations, individual 
rights. 
lnitiativcs may not: 
amend Bill of Rights, 
Public En~ployees 
Retirement System, 
right-to-work provision, 
or initiative process itself. 
Initiative shall not be 
used for appropriations or 
for any other purpose 
prohibited by the 
constitution. 
Publication 
Proposed amendment, 
existing constitutional 
provisions that would be 
changed by it, and ballot 
question must be 
published, posted at 
polling places and 
furnished to media. 
If legislature amends or 
passes an alternative, then 
both the initiative and the 
legislative proposal 
appear on the ballot and 
voters can choose between 
them. 
if possible, each proposed 
amendment published 
once a week for two 
consecutive weeks in two 
newspapers of different 
political faith in each 
county, lasting until 30 to 
15 days before election. 
Sec'y of State shall cause 
to be published as 
provided by law twice 
each month for two 
months prior to election. 
O t h e r  
legislature must approve 
at two sessions and may 
offer ssbslitute, 
petitioners can amend 
initiative, requires at least 
30% of total vote at 
election. 
Constitutional initiative 
is separate and distinct 
from statutory initiative 
provision. 
Legislature may adopt, 
amend or reject, or take 
no action on an initiative, 
but the original initiative 
still appears on the ballot, 
requires at least 40% of 
tola1 vote at election. 
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-1 'I Tr  E 2: CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT BY ClTlZEl r  S INITIATIVE IN E I G H T E E N  S T A T E S  - )  4 
State 
Oregon Const. 
art. IV, 4 1; 
art. XVll  
South Dakota 
Const. 
art. 111, 5 I; 
art. XXIII 
Model State 
Const. 
art' ' 12.01 
Conten t  Petition Process 
Petition by 8% of voters 
who voted in last 
gubernatorial election 
filed with Sec'y of State at 
least 4 months before 
election. 
Petition filed with text 
and names and addresses 
of sponsors at least one 
year before election, then 
refiled with signatures of 
at least 10% of total votes 
cast in last gubernatorial 
election. 
Variable percentage of 
voters required, petition 
is filed with secretary of 
the legislature. 
Form 
Proposed anlendment 
shall embrace one subject 
only and matters properly 
connected therewith. 
May amend one or more 
articles and related 
snbjecl matter in other 
articles as necessary to 
accomplish the objectives 
of the amendment. 
Publication 
Allows for voting on 
alternatives: legislative 
revision vs. initiative. 
Initiative is presented to 
the legislature. 
O t h e r  
Legislative proposals can 
avoid the single subject 
~ l e  if the proposed 
revision gets two-thirds 
snpermajority of all 
members in each house. 
Legislature may provide 
for withdrawal of an 
initiated amendment by 
its sponsors at arty lime 
prior to its submission to 
the voters. 
A vote in favor of the 
initiative by a majority of 
the members of the 
legislature is required to 
put it on the ballot; 
legislature may provide 
procedure for sponsors of 
initiative to withdraw it. 
